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ABSTRACT. The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (1971) and  the creation of the Alaska Permanent  Fund (1976) provided Native and 
non-Native Alaskans with two means of  trust  capital investment. To date Native Alaskans have largely chosen a strategy of investment in 
local established and/or new businesses, while the Permanent  Fund  has pursued a portfolio management strategy. Both investment means 
were examined against their stated ends  (for  the former: profit, social responsibility and cultural preservation; for the latter: savings, profit, 
and dividend distribution). It is concluded that business risk investment in an isolated and remote northern state characterized by economic 
reliance on externally controlled business cycles  is inherently risky and  that a strategy of international  portfolio management has paid far 
superior dividends. 
Given that the  current  situation in the  Canadian North (two Northern Accord agreements-in-principle and the Dene/Metis  and Yukon 
Comprehensive Land Claim agreements-in-principle achieved in 1988) parallels the  situation in Alaska in the 1970s, the  authors  propose  a 
strategy for  the creation of  a model developmental natural resource trust  fund based on the best features of  the Alaskan models. This model 
fund combines a portfolio management trust philosophy with the goal of sustainable economic development in the quest for  northern fiscal 
autonomy. 
Key words: Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Alaska Permanent Fund, resource management, Native people, economic development, 
sustainable development, trust funds, investment, Native land claims 
RÉSUMÉ. La loi Alaska  Native Claims  Settlement Act de 1971 et la création du Alaska Permanent  Fund en 1976, ont  apporté aux Alaskiens 
autochtones et non-autochtones deux méthodes de fonds de placement de capitaux.  A ce jour, les Alaskiens autochtones  ont opté en grande 
partie pour une stratégie d’investissement dans des affaires locales déjsl établies ou nouvelles, tandis que le Permanent  Fund a poursuivi une 
stratégie de gestion de portefeuille. On a examiné les deux méthodes de placement au regard de leurs objectifs (pour la première: la rentabilité, 
la responsabilité et la préservation de  la cultufe; pour la deuxième: l’épargne, la rentabilité et la répartition de dividendes). On conclut que 
l’investissement productif spéculatif dans un Etat isolé et lointain du Grand Nord, qui se caractérise par la dépendance économique de cycles 
d’affaires contrôlés de l’extérieur, comporte des risques inhérents, et qu’une stratégie de gestion de portefeuille international a rapporté des 
dividendes nettement supérieurs. 
Étant  donné  que  la situation actuelle dans le Nord canadien (deux Ententes de principes dans le Nord et  les Ententes de principe sur les 
revendications territoriales globales des Dénés et des Métis et du Yukon, signées en 1988), est une réplique de  la situation  en Alaska dans 
les années 1970,  les auteurs proposent une stratégie pour créer un fonds fiduciaire modèle pour l’exploitation des ressources naturelles, qui 
s’appuierait sur les meilleures caractéristiques des modkles alaskiens. Ce  fonds modèle allie une philosophie de placement fondée sur  la gestion 
de portefeuille avec  les objectifs de développement économique durable  dans la quête de l’autonomie financikre du Grand  Nord. 
Mots clés: Alaska  Native  Claims Settlement Act,  Alaska Permanent  Fund, gestion de ressources, autochtones, développement économique 
développement durable, fonds de placement, investissement, revendications territoriales des autochtones 
naduit  pour le journal par Nésida Loyer. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines two applied northern strategies for  the 
investment of large pools of trust capital and concludes by 
proposing a model natural resource trust  fund  for  northern 
Canada.  The  first  strategy  described, local  business 
investment, has been utilized by the Native beneficiaries and 
regional corporations created pursuant to the 1971 Alaska 
Native  Claims  Settlement Act (ANCSA) (U.S. Statutes, 1971); 
the  second,  portfolio  management,  characterizes  the 
approach of the board of trustees of the Alaska Permanent 
Fund Corporation. 
In 1971 the Native people of Alaska found themselves in 
an unprecedented situation upon the settlement of their land 
claims:  they became the owners and managers of 13 regional 
corporations under an extremely  complex  piece of legislation 
passed by the United States Congress. This legislation  created 
the regional corporations to administer a settlement of 44 
million acres of land  and  a once-only cash award of $962.5 
million. The  corporations were set up to serve the needs of 
the Native beneficiaries, and they were to operate on a profit 
basis.  At the same time they were to steward the land base 
- qualified by village corporation control of most surface 
rights - which  since time immemorial had been the basis 
of the bush economy of  village Alaska. This inherent 
potential conflict between operation of  businesses for profit 
and the stewardship of the land and  thus the culture tempered 
early enthusiasm for  the settlement. As we shall see, it also 
greatly affected the investment strategies chosen by the 
regional corporations. 
Much of the problem facing the regional corporations 
stems from unprofitable business investments. The  majority 
of these investments were made in Alaska, a state with an 
historic prospensity for economic booms and busts. The 
initial investment period unfortunately coincided with local 
and international business cycle downturns, and consequently 
Native Alaskans entered the world of high finance on very 
unfavourable terms. With few indigenous Native entre- 
preneurs in the state economy, the regional corporations 
turned to outside advisors, lawyers and consultants and paid 
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a high price for advice that sometimes was culturally and 
economically  biased. Indeed, a persistent  Alaskan joke labels 
ANCSA  as the “Alaska Lawyers and Consultants Settlement 
Act .’ ’ 
As the Native  people  of Alaska coped  with their mammoth 
new financial responsibilities, the state also found itself the 
beneficiary  of a huge  sum  of money. The 1970s were a period 
of economic boom in Alaska, with the completion of the 
Alyeska pipeline and high  world oil prices. In 1970 alone the 
state received $900 million from the sale of  oil and gas leases 
on  the  North Slope, and bowing to local political pressures 
it spent the windfall on expanded government services and 
capital  construction  projects. Realizing the merit  of 
stewarding the new resource revenues, the  state introduced 
a referendum in 1976 that resulted in the creation of a con- 
stitutionally protected and entrenched trust  fund. 
The Native  regional for-profit corporations and the Alaska 
Permanent Fund (APF) board of trustees began massive 
investment programs in the 1970s and early 1980s. The 
regional corporations largely  focussed on Alaskan business 
investments; the  fund trustees chose a portfolio management 
strategy. This paper summarizes the results of these two 
investment strategies and applies this collective investment 
experience to a model for potential adoption by both Native 
land claims  beneficiaries and proto-provincial northern legis- 
latures in Canada. We will look only at the financial impact 
and concomitant socio-cultural effects. Much more work 
needs to be done in order to determine the social and cultural 
impact of development policies. 
Although the APF and ANCSA corporations were estab- 
lished under different conditions and for different purposes, 
a comparison is still  relevant insofar as the APF and ANCSA 
corporations exemplify two different investment strategies, 
one or both of  which  may  be appropriate to Canadian cir- 
cumstances. Alaska provides a useful comparison for  the 
Canadian  North, as it is situated at the same latitude  and 
faces similar problems of isolation, high construction and 
transportation costs, small population and dependence on 
non-renewable  resources. There is also a large Native popu- 
lation, which provides a  further basis of comparison with 
northern  Canada. These geographic, environmental, demo- 
graphic and cultural similarities  between  Alaska and northern 
Canada suggest that development strategies employed in 
Alaska may  have  relevance to the  Canadian  North. While 
the Alaskan and  northern  Canadian  situations  are by no 
means  identical - e.g.,  with significant  differences  in  political 
system, population size and settlement patterns - Alaska 
perhaps provides the closest approximation of the Canadian 
North. 
It is hoped that this model will offer northern  Canadians 
a means of retaining and sustaining major new flows of 
capital from land claims settlements and  the  northern energy 
accords with the federal government. It is further hoped that 
the benefits of this  investment  strategy  will  be new sustainable 
small businesses in the  tradition advocated by the World 
Commission on Environment  and Development (1987) 
and first described by Schumacher (1974), . t h e  Dag 
Hammarskjold Foundation (197>),.+Iiggins and Higgins 
(1979), Hawken (1983,  1987), :R6& and Usher (1986), the Royal 
Commission on Employment and Unemployment (1986) 
and others. Such small businesses will build on local 
strengths, largely eschew the non-renewable resource sector, 
and focus on opportunities in the  information  and service 
sector. 
THE NATIVE REGIONAL CORPORATIONS’ 
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 
The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) 
became  law on 18 December 1971. It extinguished all out- 
standing Alaskan  Native  claims  of aboriginal title to the land, 
hunting and fishing rights and compensation arising from 
claims based on statutes or treaties. Compensation for the 
extinguishment  of the claims amounted to a  total non-taxable 
grant of $962.5 million to Alaskan Natives. In addition, 
unrestricted title to 44 million acres, including surface and 
subsurface rights, was granted. The legislation required that 
these funds be distributed to eligible  Natives by  twelve state- 
chartered regional corporations. A thirteenth regional cor- 
poration was formed for non-resident Natives who partic- 
ipated in the financial settlement but received no title to land. 
Village corporations were also established to mediate between 
regional and local interests, and they controlled most surface 
rights to  land. The regional corporations’ geographic 
boundaries within the state of Alaska are set out in Figure 
1, and  a summary profile of descriptive characteristics for 
the regional corporations in 1984 is presented in Table 1. 
Much controversy has arisen over  several aspects of the 
ANCSA settlement. Part of this controversy revolves around 
the conflict between trade-offs that must be made by 
management to meet the profit and  non-profit expectations 
held for regional corporations by both the U.S. Congress and 
Alaskan Natives. On  one  hand, Congress expected the  cor- 
porations to provide the means of improving the  “health, 
education, social and economic welfare” (U.S. Statutes, 1971) 
of Native shareholders. In  addition, they expect that share- 
holders who wish to enter the mainstream economy will  be 
provided  with  employment or business opportunities through 
the corporations. Finally,  many shareholders expect that their 
Native heritage, consisting of both  the  land and cash assets, 
will  be  preserved for future generations. Many of these broad 
expectations  fall outside the usual profit-motivated objectives 
pursued by typical corporations. Some of the expectations 
held for regional corporations go to the very issue  of cultural 
survival of Alaskan Natives. Generally, conventional corpo- 
rations are  unconcerned about issues  such  as the social welfare 
of their shareholders, since  maximizing financial profit is 
the  underlying motive for  most  corporate  decisions 
(Wuttunee, 1988). These conflicts may,  however,  be mitigated 
through investment planning that emphasizes sustainable 
small ventures and diversification of risk. 
In order to interpret the financial performance of the 
ANCSA regional corporations, it is important  to understand 
some of the operating constraints they must function under 
as a result  of the ANCSA legislation. Regional corporations 
were legislated into existence and are required to operate as 
for-profit organizations under ANCSA legislation. Conven- 
tional  corporations are usually formed in situations where 
someone has identified a product or service and decides to 
formalize the business  legally by incorporating. In  contrast, 
the regional corporations in Alaska were created by legis- 
lation.  In  addition, they are located in areas with few  low- 
risk investment opportunities, little socio-economic infra- 
structure, and small, isolated markets. 
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FIG. I .  Alaska's Native regions. 
Under section 7(f) of ANCSA, only a shareholder in the 
land claim settlement may qualify for election to a cor- 
porate board. This left the regional corporations at  start-up 
in the position of  drawing on a very small pool  of Native 
people  with  any  business  expertise.  As a consequence,  many 
non-Native business managers were hired in the early 
years  of  ANCSA  implementation.  These  managers  were  often 
in key positions to influence policy and development  strategy 
for the corporations, and arguably their advice did not always 
place Native interests first. Some problems with outside 
consultants included  incompetence  in the field for which  they 
were supposedly trained, lack  of accountability, gross  over- 
charging of fees and poor skills for communicating with 
community people. Further  problems were created by 
sections 6(c),  7(i) and 70) in the ANCSA legislation, which 
address distribution of corporate revenues.  These sections 
require regional corporations to share 70% of  revenues and 
earned  from  timber and subsurface resources  with the other 
regional corporations. No  corresponding provision  exists to 
spread potential losses from resource  development among 
the corporations. In this way Congress apparently made an 
attempt  to balance resource disparities among regional cor- 
porations, but it did so only with an eye to distribution of 
profits.  Once  again  ANCSA  statutory  requirements 
differentiate Native  regional corporations from other cor- 
porations in a manner that restricts traditional business 
practice. 
It is estimated that  the ANCSA revenue-sharing  provision 
alone has resulted in litigation costing an estimated $35 
million  between 1971 and 1984 (Berger, 1985). Other costly 
legal disputes regarding the interpretation of complicated 
ANCSA provisions  have included disputes between  regional 
corporations, between  regional and village corporations and 
between shareholders and their regional corporations. These 
disputes have tied up corporate funds and scarce human 
resources for long periods of  time.  As a result, management 
energies were diverted from the financial bottom line to liti- 
gation issues  when a sharp focus on financial success  was 
vital. In light of the foregoing  analysis,  it  is notable that  the 
regional corporations have  survived in the face of statutory 
restrictions, lack of local investment opportunities and 
management failures. 
Alaska in the 1970s was characterized by vigorous activity 
in the oil industry, and the regional corporations began 
operations in this buoyant economy. In 1973-74 there was 
an inflationary surge stimulated by the activities of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)  and 
a subsequent  economic slowdown. There was a depression 
in most of the member countries of the  Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development  (OECD)  from 1979 
TABLE 1. Profile of the  Alaskan  Regional  Corporations (1984) I4 
0 
01 
Ahtna, Inc. 
The Aleut Corp. 
Arctic Slope Reg. Corp. 
Bristol Bay Native Corp. 
Calista Corp. 
Chugach Natives Inc. 
Cook Inlet Reg., Inc. 
Doyon Corp. 
Koniag, Inc. 
Nana Reg. Corp., Inc. 
Sealaska Corp. 
1,074 
3,249 
3,738 
5,400 
13,308 
1,912 
6,264 
9,061 
3,344 
4,828 
15,819 
. 
ANCSA ANCSA Retained by Total sales Sec 7(i) F 
land cash regional Current Total Current Total Stockholders’ and other  income Net income’ Earnings P 
Shareholder entitlement’ entitlement’ corporation assets’  liabilities’  liabilities’ equity’ revenue’  r ceived (loss) per share’ 
Regional corporations enrollment (acres) (millions) (millions) (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands)  (thousands) (loss) $ 5 
0 
2.4 mil 13.0 
2.8  mil  0.5 
5.2 mil 46.0 
3.0 mil 67.4 
5.9 mil 166.1 
880  thou 24.1 
2.7 mil 77.8 
12.0 mil 113.1 
1.5 mil 41.6 
1.4 mil 60.2 
590 thou 198.6 
6.4 
19.6 
22.6 
32.6 
80.3 
11.7 
37.6 
54.6 
20.1 
29.1 
96 .O 
12,291 
3,439 
22,942 
6,058 
14,344 
15,536 
63,041 
20,448 
1,967 
10,407 
65,884 
16,481 
30,222 
47,029 
56,201 
85,021 
25,128 
126,022 
54,532 
8,815 
69,120 
162,637 
912 
1,409 
9,f500 
3,444 
6,604 
6,417 
10,009 
9,209 
5,720 
16,044 
57,041 
2,686 
12,947 
21,719 
17,684 
32,717 
8,578 
30,115 
25,225 
7,447 
18,340 
90,491 
13,795 
17,275 
25,310 
38,517 
52,304 
16,550 
95,907 
29,307 
1,368 
50,780 
72,146 
3,049 N/A 
2,934 N/A 
53,407  186 
28,959 N/A 
47,226  678 
14,127 69 
33,086 83 
20,479 459 
1,081 24 1 
27,837  629 
215,077 1,034 
(6.28) 2 
2.73 k 
7.60 
3.67 
(3.22) 
(3.65) 
28.74 
4 
(5 . w  
(6.82) 
5.79 
(.2V 
‘Total of ANCSA Section 14(h)(2), village and 12(c) selections. Calculation excludes 14(h) selections. 
’Financial data for 1984 adjusted for comparability (removed ANCSA lands, receivables from assets and shareholders’ equity). 
Net income includes extraordinary items (income or expense not derived from the  current year’s operations)  but earnings per share is calculated prior  to  extraordinary items. 
N/A - Financial information is not available. 
Source: Compiled  from ANCSA Study 1985:V-35 and corporation annual reports. 
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through 1982. Furthermore, the early eighties were marked 
by a money market crisis characterized by both high interest 
rates and increasing market volatility. High interest rates had 
the effect of limiting debt market access to only the most 
credit-worthy borrowers. 
Investments of the Alaskan regional corporations during 
the period 1974-84 ranged from portfolio investments  in term 
deposits  and marketable  securities to direct  business 
investment activity. However, direct business investment was 
the dominant approach to utilizing the new capital, and most 
corporations established new businesses and purchased 
existing  businesses on their own or with joint venture partners. 
Investments were made in a number of Alaskan resource- 
based industries, including sand and gravel,  timber,  minerals, 
fishing  and  petroleum  exploration.  Further  Alaskan 
investments were made in support services  in the fields of 
transportation  and  distribution, wholesale and retail trade, 
communications, banking, real estate, consulting and com- 
mercial construction. 
Generally, regional corporation investments tended to be 
made within their own particular regions, but diversification 
at the state level also occurred. Most ventures were on a 
modest scale, although  a number of corporations worked 
toward major mineral and renewable resource projects. 
Development  of the regional service sectors occurred more 
frequently because the process  of actually transferring the 
ANCSA land base to the corporations was greatly  prolonged. 
The delay in land conveyancing directly impeded access to 
natural resources, and therefore their development and mar- 
keting by the regional corporations. Regions also varied 
widely in their resource potential. 
We now turn  to  an examination of traditional financial 
performance ratios, including leverage (the use of sup- 
plementary debt capital to increase the returns on equity) 
and profitability (return on equity), for 11 (2 corporations 
do not make this information available)  of the 13 regional 
corporations  for  the period 1974-84. These ratios are used 
to evaluate the relative performance of the regional corpo- 
rations. They measure the current financial performance of 
an organization relative to its past, as well as  relative to outside 
benchmarks, such as comparably measured ratios of com- 
peting companies. The  data set is also described using basic 
summary statistics regarding the sample distribution of the 
performance indicators including  means, standard deviations 
and ranges for each year  (Table  2). 
Corporations “leverage” themselves when they borrow 
money from lenders to increase their available capital. The 
greater the resource to borrowed  money (or  debt capital), 
the more financial risk a  corporation assumes. Given the 
choice, most corporations would  prefer to raise capital via 
sale of shares (equity capital) than by incurring debts to 
lenders.  When an individual buys  shares,  he or she  personally 
places  money at risk in the  hands of corporate management. 
If this  money is poorly  invested, share values  fall and investors 
suffer. When an individual lends money to a corporation, 
the loan generally  is  secured against corporate assets, and 
a schedule of repayment is formalized by contract. If this 
loan is poorly invested and repayment becomes a problem, 
the  corporation may be forced to sell assets to comply with 
its contract obligations. To the degree that essential per- 
forming assets are sold off to satisfy the  debt,  the continued 
existence  of the company may be called into question. Con- 
TABLE 2. Financial performance ratios - mean,  standard deviation 
and  range by regional  corporation  for  the  period 1974-84 
Leverage Profitability 
Ahtna 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Aleut 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Arctic Slope 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Bristol Bay 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Calista 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Chugach 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
CIRI 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Doyon 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Koniag 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
NANA 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Sealaske 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
Total 
mean 
standard deviation 
minimum 
maximum 
0.21 
0.09 
0.08 
0.39 
0.36 
0.17 
0.14 
0.60 
0.47 
0.12 
0.27 
0.66 
0.40 
0.23 
0.05 
0.71 
0.34 
0.18 
0.07 
0.67 
0.31 
0.16 
0.03 
0.64 
0.24 
0.09 
0.06 
0.35 
0.16 
0.12 
0.06 
0.45 
0.33 
0.24 
0.12 
0.84 
0.30 
0.09 
0.20 
0.55 
0.23 
0.19 
0.02 
0.55 
0.30 
0.18 
0.02 
0.84 
0.06 
0.05 
0.03 
0.15 
- 0.03 
0.09 
- 0.20 
0.07 
- 0.01 
0.26 
- 0.58 
0.23 
0.03 
0.09 
-0.14 
0.23 
- 0.08 
0.08 
- 0.23 
0.04 
-0.12 
0.09 
- 0.28 
0.03 
0.10 
0.08 
- 0.02 
0.22 
- 0.06 
0.19 
0.58 
0.07 
-0.36 
0.59 
- 1.59 
- 0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.00 
0.08 
- 0.01 
0.05 
-0.14 
0.06 
- 0.04 
0.24 
0.23 
- 1.59 
Leverage: total  debt/total assets. 
Profitability (return on equity): net income/average total equity. 
Source: Wuttunee, 1988. 
270 / M. ROBINSON et al. 
sequently, the ratio of total debt to total assets is an important 
indication of financial health: the higher the proportion of 
debt to assets, the greater the risk of default on debt 
repayment obligations. 
The use  of  leverage  by the 11 regional corporations reviewed 
by the authors averaged 30% for the period of study 
(1974-84). In this way the regional corporations financed one- 
third of their asset book values by debt capital. The leverage 
ratio actually rose from 14% in 1974 to 38% in 1984. Table 
2 indicates that the Aleut, Arctic Slope, Bristol Bay, Calista 
and Koniag  regional corporations all  averaged 33 Yo or greater 
leverage ratios for the period of study, reflecting aggressive 
use  of debt financing from their corporate inception. While 
these  figures  may  be  misleading,  especially f increased annual 
leverage ratios  indicate  greater  borrowing to finance renewable 
resource production, they do show a strong reliance upon 
debt capital for corporate operations. This reliance upon debt 
has  placed corporate assets in jeopardy and, given the strong 
reliance on local  business  investment,  has  linked the financial 
health of the regional corporations to the financial well-being 
of Alaska. With its pronounced history of economic boom 
and bust cycles, Alaska is certainly a questionable venue for 
such an investment strategy. 
A corporation’s profit and ultimately its success can be 
described by the rate of return earned on shareholders’ (or 
owner’s) equity. Return on owner’s equity (ROE) denotes 
the rate of return earned by an organization’s shareholders. 
The rate of return should reflect the perceived risk of the 
corporation from an equity holder’s perspective. 
This measure is  very poor for the sample of the 11  corpo- 
rations described, showing a cumulative negative return of 
4% for the period 1974-84. Individually Cook Inlet Regional 
Corporation has the best  relative profitability result, with 
an ROE of 10%. Seven  of the 11 corporations had a negative 
average  ROE for  the period. Interestingly, 4 of the 5 corpo- 
rations with the high  average  leverage ratios (Aleut, Bristol 
Bay, Calista and Koniag) also had negative ROES, raising 
the question of their overall financial stability.  At this time 
Calista Regional Corporation’s creditors are trying to 
foreclose on a $20 million loan and Koniag  Regional Corpo- 
ration is  having  severe problems  (Wuttunee, 1988). The Bering 
Straits Regional Corporation has filed for bankruptcy. It 
appears from this analysis that business  ventures established 
in a risky environment do not always promote economic and 
socio-cultural sustainability. 
Since the publication of Berger’s Village Journey (1985), 
the regional corporations mounted a  strong congressional 
lobby to have  ANCSA  amended to prevent the land base from 
falling  vulnerable to unsatisfied  creditors and corporate take- 
overs in 1991. This was  achieved at the end of 1987. The U.S. 
Congress passed the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act 
Amendments of 1987 (P.L. 100-241, 101 Stat. 1788), which 
restricted the ability to sell or otherwise alienate shares - 
unless approved by a  majority of stockholders - and also 
extended the tax exemptions on undeveloped ANCSA lands 
(Morehouse, 1988). 
THE STATE OF ALASKA’S STRATEGY PORTFOLIO 
MANAGEMENT AND THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND 
This  section  presents a different  strategy  for the investment 
of trust capital, the use of permanent trust funds in portfolio 
investment. Simply defined, permanent trust  funds are 
government-administered accounts for the management and 
investment  of  public  money,  with a special purpose designated 
for the disposition of fund  capital  and income. The 
government administers and invests the rents obtained from 
common property resources (e.g., royalties or severance  taxes 
on non-renewable resources) and stewards these rents for the 
public  good. Trust funds usually  enjoy  some  special 
protection that restricts the use and expenditure of the 
principal. 
In our discussion, trust funds are  regarded  as a public  entity 
for  the preservation of resource revenues, predicated upon 
two basic features. First, the fund strategy assumes that 
natural resource  revenues should not be used for current con- 
sumption alone, but rather should be  extended across several 
generations or in perpetuity. As the land belongs to both 
present and  future generations, its wealth should be  used to 
benefit  all  generations.  Trust funds provide a means of  saving 
some of the wealth  derived from non-renewable resources 
for use in the future. 
Second, trust  funds provide a means to replace resource 
rents, which  will  eventually  decline and ultimately cease to 
exist altogether. A region dependent on non-renewable 
resource income will see those resources depleted; after  that, 
both production and revenues  will stop. However, if some 
of the resource  revenues  have  been  saved  over time, they will 
provide a  pool of investment capital that will earn interest 
and dividend income and ultimately replace the non- 
renewable  resource  revenues  (Fig. 2). In this sense trust funds 
transform a non-renewable energy or mineral resource into 
a renewable financial resource. 
Trust funds may  be classified into two basic types (Pretes, 
1988). The first type, a pure “trust” model, emphasizes 
savings. Key objectives of this type of fund are security of 
principal, avoidance of risk and  the generation of income. 
Fund managers operating under a  trust model will select 
investments  based on financial criteria alone.  They will  search 
for the best investment, that providing a high return with 
a low risk, whether or  not  the investment is located inside 
or outside  the region. In many cases this involves  investing 
money outside of the state or province. Trust models 
Income from permanent 
trust fund investments 
Income  from 
non-renewable 
resource 
Time  after  start  of  income  program 
FIG. 2. Relationship between permanent trust fund income and non- 
renewable  resource  income,  with  trust fund income replacing  resource  income 
as time goes on. 
emphasize stability, diversification of the portfolio and 
guaranteed return. 
The second type of fund model is “developmental.” This 
type also takes into account social criteria when  investing. 
A developmental fund will maintain investments within the 
region  in the hopes of stimulating employment or providing 
local capital. Some low-risk, high-income investments will 
be sacrificed in favour of those with a direct local impact. 
Developing infrastructure and diversifying the local economy 
are  two paths open to developmental funds. Their  investments 
may not produce a financial return,  but they  may  provide 
some intangible benefit to the local community. Develop- 
mental funds emphasize local commitment, a restructuring 
of the economy and investments with a positive social 
contribution. 
A combination of these principles is also possible.  Several 
of the  trust funds mentioned below divide their portfolios 
between  financial and social  investments. We advocate a com- 
bination of the two  models,  with a tilt toward the trust concept. 
Permanent trust funds are usually a feature of regions that 
depend on non-renewable  resource  income. Funds have  been 
established both on an international  and sub-national basis. 
Some  examples  of international funds are found in  Venezuela, 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran and Oman. All  of the funds noted 
developed from excess oil revenues. Since a northern 
Canadian  fund would operate on a sub-national level only, 
international  funds will not be  examined  here; instead, we 
will look only at sub-national funds. Some examples include 
the Alberta Heritage Savings Trust Fund, the Permanent 
Wyoming  Mineral Tkust Fund, the Montana Permanent Coal 
Trust Fund, the New Mexico State Permanent Fund, the New 
Mexico  Severance Tax Permanent Fund and  the Alaska Per- 
manent Fund Corporation. 
The  Alberta  Heritage Savings  Ti-ust Fund  (AHSTF)  exempli- 
fies the developmental fund model. The AHSTF invests 
heavily within the province  of Alberta through the purchase 
of bonds in  provincially  owned corporations. It also consists 
of social assets that  do not produce a return and include such 
items as irrigation projects, rail hopper cars, a provincial 
recreational park and medical and academic scholarship 
endowments. A smaller part of the AHSTF is  invested in 
a diverse stock and bond portfolio  and in loans to other 
provinces. 
The permanent trust  funds of New Mexico, Montana  and 
Wyoming  have adopted a combination of the developmental 
and trust approaches. Although these funds are  much  smaller 
than their Alberta and Alaska counterparts  and  are neither 
northern  nor  Canadian, they are nevertheless worth some 
consideration as they  developed without the massive  resource 
revenue  windfalls that accrued to Alberta and Alaska. Infor- 
mation on these funds and their investment  practices, as well 
as information on the AHSTF, is given by Pretes and 
Robinson (1989). 
Alaska illustrates an example of a permanent trust  fund 
predicated on  trust principles. The Alaska Permanent Fund 
(APF) emphasizes security of principal, high return  and  the 
use of financial criteria only in investment selection. It is 
to the APF  that we shall turn  to examine the strategy of 
portfolio management in the context of a permanent natural 
resource trust fund. 
Much has already been written on the Alaska Permanent 
Fund and we will not  go  into detail here.  However, some dis- 
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cussion is necessary to illustrate the differences  in  investment 
strategy between the APF and the ANCSA  regional 
corporations. 
Alaskans conceived  of a fund in the early 1960s, although 
this did not really gain support until shortly after the  major 
oil  discovery at  Prudhoe Bay (Bradner, 1987). A number of 
factors, most important  the rapid rise in oil production,  the 
construction of a new pipeline and the quadrupling of  world 
petroleum  prices,  combined to give the state massive  resource 
revenues within a short period of  time. Alaskans began to 
consider the options  for use  of the revenues, as well as the 
implications for the state and  its future. After seeing  $900 
million from the sale of the first leases spent on state capital 
projects in a short time, residents of the state viewed a trust 
fund as a stabilizing mechanism that would provide some 
restraint on massive  government spending. In 1976 the estab- 
lishment of a permanent trust fund was  approved by the voters 
in a statewide referendum. At least 25% of mineral royalties 
and  other resource  revenues (but  not severance  taxes) were 
required by the state constitution to be deposited into the 
APF (APF,  1987a).  This  provision,  plus substantial additional 
transfers of excess  revenues from the general fund, allowed 
the APF  to grow at a rapid rate, and  the  total balance is  now 
over $9.7 billion (APF, 1988b). 
Several features of the APF warrant special attention  and 
should be taken into account in the consideration of a 
northern Canadian model. These are investment policy, 
management and accountability, inflation proofing, the 
dividend program and  fund publicity. 
The APF operates primarily as a trust,  although it does 
have a developmental  function,  through  the dividend 
program, as well (Pretes, 1988). The APF has  three  objectives: 
1) to save a portion of the wealth generated through non- 
renewable resource development; 2) to protect these savings 
from loss of value; and 3) to invest these savings to produce 
an income (Alaska Statutes 37.13.020). These objectives 
appear to have been adequately fulfilled, due in large part 
to skillful financial management and an income-oriented 
investment strategy. The  fund  has managed to save 21% of 
the $28.8 billion derived from the Prudhoe Bay oil fields 
(APF,  1988a). There has been no loss  of principal, even  when 
inflation is taken into  account,  and  the  fund now produces 
an income of about $1.0 billion a year. 
The APF actually  consists of  two  different accounts, shown 
in Figure 3. The  fund itself is constitutionally protected, and 
no principal may be withdrawn without the support of a 
majority of Alaskans as evidenced through a referendum. 
Income from the  fund is deposited into the Earnings Reserve 
Account, and distribution takes three basic forms. The 
smaller Earnings Reserve Account may  be appropriated by 
the  state legislature. A large part of the income is  placed  in 
the Permanent Fund, where it becomes inviolate, requiring 
a constitutional  amendment o withdraw it. This takes place 
through both  inflation-proofing provisions (see  below) and 
special  transfers. The remaining funds are  either apportioned 
out as dividends (see below) or retained in the Earnings 
Reserve Account. As of late 1988 the Earnings Reserve 
Account had a balance of $0.7 billion, while the Permanent 
Fund contained $9.0 billion (APF, 1988b). 
The investments themselves emphasize security and an 
income-oriented approach.  The 1987 allocation target was 
83% in bonds, 12% in stocks, and 5% in real estate (APF, 
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1988a). Most of the  bond portfolio consists of high-quality 
Treasury bonds, backed by the United States Government. 
They are very  low risk and have produced a realized nominal 
annual  return of  11.5% and a total  annual  return of  13.6% 
averaged  over the last five  years  (APF,  1987a),  where  realized 
return refers to the actual gain the  fund made from the sale 
of an asset. Unrealized gains are those where the value  of 
the asset  has  increased, but it has not yet been  sold. The stocks 
have also done very well, earning a total  return of  22.2% 
for the fiscal year ending 30 June 1987. The stock market 
crash of October 1987 had only a minimal effect on the  total 
portfolio (APF, 1987b).  Real estate has also done well,  with 
a realized return of 7.5% in  fiscal 1987 and a total  return 
of 12.3% over the same period (APF, 1988a). 
dedicated oil revenues  special appropriations 
/ 2 \ 
b 
L 1 
Permanent  Fund  (principal) 
earnings 
Earnings  Reserve Account 
- inflation-proofing  divide ds 
FIG. 3. Organization of the  Alaska  Permanent  Fund,  showing  the  Permanent 
Fund  and  the  Earnings  Reserve Account. Source:  Alaska  Permanent  Fund, 
1987a. 
It should be noted that nearly all of the APF investments 
have  been made outside the state,  with only about  5% within 
Alaska. This strategy is based on the argument that capital 
markets are functioning adequately in Alaska and  that there 
is no need  for  government  intervention to subsidize 
development. The testimony of economists Kenneth J. Arrow 
and Maxwell J. Fry, among others, before the board of 
trustees of the Permanent Fund indicated some of the 
problems associated with the state assuming the role of fin- 
ancier (Arrow, 1982; Fry, 1982). If a project is worthy of 
investment,  outside  capital will support it, and it is 
unnecessary for  the government to get involved.  Moreover, 
if investments  are made outside Alaska, then when the Alaska 
economy is experiencing a downturn, it is  likely that  the well- 
balanced portfolio will not be seriously impacted. Only 
financial criteria are  considered. By  way of example, it can be 
noted that the real  estate  investments are distributed as follows 
within the United States: 41% in the eastern United States, 
23% in the  South, 17% in the Midwest and 19% in the West. 
Investments are made where the potential for investment 
returns is the best, and local investments - which are  not 
only risky but also subject to political bias - are eschewed. 
The management structure of the  fund is an important 
aspect in terms of avoiding political and social biases,  which 
open  funds to charges of being nothing more than “slush 
funds.” In Alberta, for  example, the Alberta Heritage  Savings 
Trust Fund is managed by the provincial  cabinet  alone,  which, 
despite the advantages of operating in secret, opens the  fund 
to charges of back-room politics, personal interest and elite 
decision making. The APF has avoided these charges by 
adopting a public decision-making style that is partially 
removed from political pressures. Part of this is based on 
the investment strategy outlined above. If substantial 
investments were to be made within the state, one would 
expect that various  regions and interest groups would compete 
for a share of the  distribution. 
The APF is managed by a board of trustees, the members 
of  which  serve  staggered four-year terms. One member is the 
commissioner of the Department of  Revenue, and  another 
is a cabinet officer selected by the governor. The remaining 
four trustees, also selected by the governor, are chosen from 
the private sector and must have demonstrated experience 
in financial management. These latter  four members serve 
in a voluntary capacity and receive no salary, only a $400 
honorarium  for each day spent in board or public meetings. 
Board members have included local businessmen, bankers 
and directors of Native regional corporations. 
The board of trustees is  responsible for general  investment 
policy. There is also a staff, including an executive director, 
that handles the day-to-day operations of the fund. More 
specific investment decisions are the responsibility of the 
private financial investment firms hired by the fund to manage 
the portfolio. Each of these is accountable not only to the 
board,  but also to the Alaskan public, for they may  be  asked 
at public meetings to justify and explain the investment 
choices and returns on the sections of the portfolio on which 
they advise. The trustees, too, appear at frequent public 
meetings held in various cities to answer questions about the 
fund. This open and accessible  style  of management permits 
citizen participation  and prevents political biases from 
dominating the investment strategy. After all, it is public 
money, and all Alaskans are beneficiaries of the  trust  fund. 
An important feature of the APF is the inflation-proofing 
provision. Without such a provision, inflation would eat away 
at the  return on investment and ultimately reduce the value 
of the principal. This is one of the most forward-thinking 
aspects of the Alaska investment strategy and is  very 
important for any Canadian fund model. Alaska. Statute 
37.13.145 requires the reinvestment (transfer from the 
Earnings Reserve to principal) of an amount necessary to 
offset the rate of inflation in the previous year. For  example, 
if the value  of the principal declined by 5% due to a 5% 
rate of inflation, this amount would  have to be transferred 
to principal to retain the same value in current dollars. 
Without this provision, the current dollar value and  pur- 
chasing power  of the fund would be seriously eroded. Per- 
manent Fund economists have calculated the probable 
inflation rates each year up to 2005, based on various 
assumptions. These calculations, coupled with estimates of 
oil prices and probable rates of return, allow fund managers 
to project the size of the fund’s income and principal over 
the next  20  years. This is an important component of the 
state budget, especially as oil  revenues continue to decline. 
A unique feature of the APF is the  annual  distribution 
of part of the fund’s income in the  form of dividends to 
residents of the state. Since the program was instituted in 
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES / 273 
1982, dividends have ranged  between $331.29 to $1000.00 per 
person, paid annually.  Table 3 shows the size of the dividends 
from 1982 to 1987. 
TABLE 3. Alaska Permanent Fund dividend amount per capita 
since the inception of the program in 1982l 
Year  Per capita  dividend 
1982  $1ooO.002 
1983 386.15’ 
1984 331.29 
1985 404.00 
1986 556.26 
1987 708.19 
‘All amounts given in United States dollars. 
’Funding  source  was a legislative  appropriation  from  the  General  Fund. 
’Funding  source was a combination of General  Fund  revenues  and  Permanent 
Source: Alaska Permanent Fund, 1988a. 
Fund earnings. 
Dividends are paid out of fund income.  Averaged  over the 
last ten years, about 34% of total  fund income has been dis- 
tributed in the form of dividend payments. Figure 4 shows 
the  distribution of APF income, including the  amount paid 
out as dividends. 
The amount of the annual dividend was formerly cal- 
culated as 50% of the “average net income of the  Corpo- 
ration  for  the last five fiscal years” (Alaska Statutes 
37.13.140). However, effective 1 July 1986, this statute was 
amended and  the new formula provided for half of “21% 
of the net income of the  Corporation  for  the last five fiscal 
years.” Hence, a larger proportion of fund income was ear- 
marked in 1986 for dividend distribution. 
The dividend program serves  several functions in the state. 
It is based in part on the argument that individual Alaskans, 
rather than the state government, should spend the money. 
In this sense it gives residents greater freedom of choice in 
the disposition of state wealth. Another feature is that it 
“buys”  support for the APF by helping to ensure that  the 
fund principal will be protected, as few Alaskans would call 
for a depletion of the fund since their annual dividend 
depends on it. In Alberta, for example, there has been con- 
siderable call for spending the principal of the Alberta 
Heritage Savings  Trust Fund. This demand for immediate 
expenditure of fund principal has been  largely  avoided in 
Alaska, due in part  to the fact that individual Alaskans have 
a personal stake in the APF and its continued success. The 
dividend  program also helps  in matters of accountability. The 
amount of the  annual dividend is in part  a reflection of the 
financial success of the  fund - the larger the income, the 
larger the dividend. A  drop in the size  of the dividend would 
prompt questions from recipients as to why the income 
declined. 
From a macro perspective, the dividend program has had 
a positive overall effect on the economy of Alaska. A study 
conducted in 1984 by economists at the  Institute for Social 
and Economic Research at the University of Alaska (Knapp 
et al., 1984) indicated both widespread public support  for 
the program and a positive impact of the program on the 
Alaska economy. Their study notes that about 60% of 
Alaskans favour the program, 30% have  mixed  feelings and 
only about 10% think  it is a  bad idea. For 17% of Alaskans, 
the 1982 dividend - the largest paid so far - represented 
more than  a 20% increase in family income. The dividends 
also accounted for 17% of the increase in disposable income 
for the years 1981 -83. The dividends have also  helped to create 
5000 new jobs in the state, but they have had little impact 
on inflation. Dividends also generated employment growth 
in sectors not normally affected by direct  government  expen- 
ditures. Government expenditures tend to enhance growth 
in government- or construction-related industries, while the 
dividend program prompted growth in support industries, 
such as trade, services and finance (Knapp et ai., 1984) - 
interestingly enough, the national growth sectors of the 
Canadian economy (Clarkson Gordon/ Woods Gordon, 
1986). Today, dividends are the fifth largest primary industry 
in the state, after oil, federal government spending, fishing 
and tourism (APF, 1987a). 
Although the dividend program resulted in advantages to 
the state, there are some disadvantages inherent in such a 
policy. The most significant is that the payment of dividends 
Transferred 
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FIG. 4. Distribution of Alaska  Permanent  income  since  inception  in  1977. 
Source: Alaska Permanent Fund, 1988a. 
depletes the government’s financial wealth, just as public 
spending in the form of infrastructure reduces state assets. 
Dividends are another form of public spending, and if state 
revenues drop, state spending in the form of dividends will 
be affected. Thus, while short-term benefits may be evident 
in the guise of higher employment, higher personal income 
and  other similar indicators, this cannot be maintained when 
fund  and state income are reduced. Any potential dividend 
program forming part of a  Canadian  fund will  have to take 
into account the depleting aspect of dividends as a type of 
public spending. 
As the  function of permanent trust  funds is to foster and 
protect public money  held as a  common property resource, 
there is a duty on the  part of the  fund administrators to 
inform  and educate the public about  the disposition and 
investment of the funds. The  APF has developed a compre- 
hensive public awareness program designed to inform 
Alaskans about their fund. Financial information  about  the 
APF is  freely available; both  annual  and monthly financial 
reports are distributed to anyone who requests them. These 
reports contain  a fairly detailed discussion of the fiscal state 
of the  fund. Balance sheets and statements of changes in 
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financial  position are supplemented  with  listings  of  real  estate 
properties acquired, for example. These statements are 
audited by external private firms, and hence are subjected 
to generally accepted accounting principles. 
More  direct components of the public information program 
include open meetings, the speakers bureau, television 
programs and direct-mailed brochures. The speakers bureau 
provides speakers to various civic functions to inform the 
public about the fund.  A television video is also available, 
and this has been  extensively  used  in junior  and senior high 
schools throughout the state. The brochure, entitled Your 
Alaska Permanent  Fund (APF, 1987c),  is  mailed out with 
the dividend cheques, reaching every resident. Public 
awareness is necessary to retain support for the APF; a 
counter example can be found in Alberta, where information 
is  very  limited and 50% of the population does not even  know 
the value  of the Alberta fund (Nikiforuk et al., 1987). 
The  APF has  succeeded in preserving a portion of  Alaskan 
non-renewable  resource  revenues for  the benefit of future 
generations and in  producing an income  for the state,  utilizing 
a  trust concept. This approach is premised upon  the saving 
of principal, the reinvestment  of income, and  the emphasis 
on a diversified investment portfolio. 
A MODEL NATURAL RESOURCE TRUST FUND FOR 
NORTHERN CANADA 
1988 has been a signal year for the  promotion of northern 
autonomy. In 12 months the Dene/Metis  and Yukon com- 
prehensive land claims have both moved from the decade- 
long negotiations to the agreement-in-principle stage, and 
both the Yukon and  the Northwest Territories have  signed 
agreements-in-principle on Northern Accords (Canada, 
1988a,b,c). All four agreements identify principles under 
which final agreements will be negotiated over the next  two 
years, and all four will create the necessary preconditions 
for  a series  of model trust  funds in the  Canadian  North. As 
well, the Tungavik Federation of Nunavut is also working 
toward an agreement-in-principle that may also endorse the 
trust  fund concept. 
The Dene/Metis agreement-in-principle provides cash 
compensation of $500 million in 1990 dollars. This compen- 
sation money will be paid over 15 -20 years and will 
accumulate interest at  about 10% after  the  final agreement. 
While the compensation provisions do not become activated 
until the signing of the final agreement, local discussions 
are already under way regarding investment policy: 
About 100 Native leaders and businessmen unanimously 
passed  a  resolution on Thursday to put  money  from  a  land- 
claims  agreement in a  trust  fund to be invested in “a safe 
and  prudent fashion.” [Globe and Mail, 1988.1 
The Dene /Metis cash compensation is to be managed by 
“organizations . . . to be described in the  final agreement” 
(Dene / Metis Negotiations Secretariat, 1988). Interestingly, 
these “organizations may be trusts or corporations’’ 
(Dene/Metis Negotiations Secretariat, 1988) and they will 
be entirely owned and controlled by the  Dene/Metis. Mem- 
bership or shareholdings in these organizations will not be 
transferable. Clearly the negotiators have learned from the 
share transfer problems created by ANCSA. 
The Yukon  Land  Claim  Framework  Agreement 
(DIAND/CYI, 1988) provides  cash compensation in the 1988 
aggregate  value  of  $232  million.  At  present  this compensation 
will be paid out in 15 consecutive annual payments, com- 
mencing on the  date of signature of the Final Agreement. 
With respect to investment policy, settlement corporations 
will  be created without share capital and with the capability 
to provide loans to individuals to enhance commercial  fishing, 
traditional harvesting and cultural activities and to create an 
elders  assistance  program.  Interestingly, the loans so provided 
may not establish a controlling equity interest in any  venture. 
As well, settlement corporations shall only  make  investments 
in accordance with the provisions of Schedule I11 of the 
Pension Benefit Standards Act. 
The Government of Canada, the Yukon Territorial 
Government and  the Council for Yukon Indians state their 
support for the concept of an Indian-controlled trust 
company, and they further agree to examine the potential 
viability of such an institution. If such a trust company 
appears viable, all parties to the agreement will facilitate its 
creation. Once again it appears  that  the beneficiaries are at 
least considering the creation of trust funds. 
The two Northern Accord agreements-in-principle (AIPs) 
also contemplate new revenue sources for  the Yukon and the 
Northwest Territories. Specifically, both  Northern Accord 
AIPs commit all oil and gas revenues from onshore for  the 
use and benefit of the territorial governments. Similarly, all 
offshore Beaufort Sea revenues  will be shared by and  for  the 
use and benefit of the territorial governments (Canada, 
1988~). The negative aspect of these AIPs, however,  is the 
provision stating: 
that as oil and gas revenues become available, federal 
assistance  under  the  Formula  Financing  Agreement or suc- 
cessor agreements will be reduced. [Canada, 1988c.l 
While federal transfer payments to the Yukon will not 
necessarily  be eliminated when (and if) oil or gas starts to 
flow south, they will certainly be trimmed. Faced with 
becoming oil and gas revenue masters in their own houses, 
both  the Yukon and  the Northwest Territories have a clear 
incentive to establish some sort of trust  fund against the day 
when non-renewable resources run  out. 
Economists are already asking why either government 
would bother to deplete a non-renewable resource if the 
Canadian Government is  still  committed to transfer  payments 
under the Formula Financing Agreement (Calgary Herald, 
1988). Obviously the federal government believes that it can 
find  a  formula  that will promote development of offshore 
and onshore reserves (should they  exist in marketable quan- 
tities) by paying a form of cash bonus to the Yukon and the 
Northwest Territories. Should marketable energy  reserves  be 
established and the elusive formula be found, some new 
money (in excess of existing federal transfer payments) will 
flow to the  territorial government(s), and they  will be faced 
with the problem of preserving trust capital from a depleting 
resource. When faced with this prospect they too will  have 
reached the stage where the establishment of a natural 
resource trust  fund makes eminent good sense. 
As we have  seen in this paper, a natural resource trust  fund 
is an option available to both Native beneficiaries and 
northern legislatures. We have  examined only financial 
strategies - local business investment and portfolio 
management - and suggest that  the  latter may be more 
appropriate in general terms to remote regions such as the 
Canadian North. While  social and cultural factors in  selecting 
a strategy are of equal importance, these are usually case- 
specific and as such we do not deal with them here. Future 
research should be directed toward these issues, and case 
studies may be the most germane form of analysis. 
In designing the ideal Canadian model  of  such a trust fund, 
we can benefit by the experiences  of Alaska, Alberta and 
the Rocky Mountain states in their molding and  adaptation 
of trust  fund models. At the outset we must examine the fol- 
lowing  issues: 
primary trust  fund objectives, 
legal structure of the  fund, 
developmental assistance philosophy, 
management philosophy and accountability, 
investment mix, 
dividend philosophy, and 
public information, review and  education processes. 
In  our discussion of the ANCSA and APF objectives we 
have seen both conflict (profit maximization versus social 
responsibility and cultural preservation) and simplicity 
(profit, inflation proofing and dividend distribution) at work. 
We conclude that new funds must avoid structural conflict 
of  objectives and at the same time  provide  greater  detail bout 
desired ends. Any new fund should clearly consider the 
primary roles of risk, liquidity and rate of return on 
investment. 
Cautious preservation of the  majority of fund capital is 
important. In the quest  for  sustainable  development, the fund 
itself must be sustained. Following the lead of the APF, any 
new fund must be inflation-proofed on  an  annual basis, and 
sufficient investment  revenues must always be generated to 
enable capital preservation. While an element of risk must 
be present in the fund’s developmental portfolio, this risk 
must be clearly offset by an investment core that pays a 
guaranteed rate of return sufficient to provide inflation 
proofing. Maintenance of this investment core will limit 
investment income available for developmental  work but will 
guarantee a sustainable fund. 
Liquidity  objectives  must support the cautious preservation 
of fund capital. Consequently the  fund must not develop 
excessive “deemed assets” that may diminish in value (e.g., 
real estate portfolios, public works, etc.) and must not tie 
up capital for long periods of time in assets that  are vul- 
nerable to depreciation. A careful blending of government 
bonds  and treasury bills is therefore recommended as the 
investment core of the  fund. 
Rate of return on investment must be sufficient to preserve 
t h e a t a l  and generate  investment income to enable the local 
developmental work of the  fund.  The developmental work 
will draw revenues from blue chip stock dividends, accrued 
interest from bonds  and treasury bills and selective business 
risk investments of fund capital. 
To a large degree the legal structure  of  natural resource 
trust funds depends on how control is exercised by the 
beneficiaries (either the state or land claim beneficiaries). 
Mechanisms of control can range from a bank account reg- 
istered in the name of the trustee to a corporation  run by 
the trustee for  the benefit of  the beneficiaries. Territorial 
and federal tax consequences for investment and interest 
income will also condition the legal form of trust  funds held 
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by non-governmental beneficiaries. Among governments, 
trust  fund legal structures may also show considerable var- 
iation, as, for example,  between Alaska and Alberta. Whereas 
Alaska opted for incorporation of the fund with  management 
by an  appointed  board of trustees, Alberta settled for legis- 
lative enactment of a fund managed by the provincial  cabinet. 
In general the establishment of a corporate trust fund 
structure seems the preferred path to follow, with an 
appointed  board of trustees who serve in this capacity for 
a specified term and whose appointment is made by the 
beneficiaries - either Native people or residents of the Ter- 
ritories, depending on the  fund.  Standard  annual  corporate 
reporting and audit requirements will therefore be guaranteed 
by law, and political meddling in investment policy will be 
minimized. 
Given the checkered history of industrial development in 
the  Canadian  North  and  the continued village reliance on 
the bush economy, developmental assistance to regionally 
sustainable small businesses offers an attractive avenue. 
Pretes and Robinson (1989) explored the relationships 
between natural resource trust funds and sustainable 
economic development and suggested five mechanisms 
for  the  promotion of multisectoral sustainable development 
initiatives: 
direct allocation of investment income from the  trust  fund 
by  way of grants to sustainable multisectoral development 
ventures; 
investment of trust  fund principal in prudently managed 
banks  and/or  trust companies; 
selective and controlled investment of trust  fund principal 
in small business start-ups; 
loans from the  trust  fund  to locally controlled small busi- 
nesses; and 
per capita disbursement of investment income to 
beneficiaries to stimulate local purchasing power. 
A developmental provision would  be allocation of trust 
fund investment income to an aggressive beneficiary 
scholarship  program.  Recent  community  economic 
development research has underscored the importance of 
human capacity building prior to direct investment in new 
enterprise development (Centre for Community Economic 
Development, 1988). 
The above mechanisms are recommended as useful 
guidelines for the establishment of a developmental  assistance 
policy to promote  northern sustainable development. In this 
way both trust fund capital and investment and interest 
income can be allied to build regional autonomy and 
self-reliance. 
Given that political interference in investment decisions 
must be minimized, the beneficiaries should work to create 
a management philosophy that favours  investment talent and 
a team-work approach. As we  have seen  in the APF example, 
the state’s governor appoints a six-member board of 
trustees, two of whom are members of the Alaska cabinet 
and  four of whom are public members appointed solely on 
the basis of fiscal management skill and relevant past 
experience. 
Given that  natural resource trust  funds  are themselves the 
political creations of public beneficiaries, there is a need to 
reflect at least a modest level of political input.  The crucial 
issue is the balance of political versus financial input to 
management decisions. In this respect the APF board 
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structure is a most appealing management model, and when 
allied  with the APF corporate structure it also  satisfies annual 
public reporting requirements. 
Once a corporate structure and objectives are agreed 
upon,  the developmental assistance philosophy chosen 
and the management team appointed, it is time to develop 
the investment mix. Fund management should be con- 
strained to develop the investment mix on the basis 
of prudent management and diversification, with direction 
from the beneficiaries. The primary objectives will be 
determined politically by fund beneficiaries and trustees, 
while the investment mix  will  be determined non-politically 
on the basis of prudent investment opportunities. Hence, 
the selection of competent and experienced investment 
managers is paramount. 
In allocating investment percentages of principal within 
a hypothetical Native or  territorial  trust  fund, managers will 
be constrained by the primary objectives and developmental 
assistance  philosophy of the  fund.  Judging  from  the 
experience  of the Alaskan Native corporations, efforts 
should be made at the outset (and perhaps for the first 
10 - 20 years of fund management) to minimize local business 
risk  investment.  Therefore  an  initial 5 %  allocation 
to small business loans and/or equity positions makes 
good sense. If the beneficiaries desire potential board 
membership in banks and  trust companies, and  thus some 
degree of influence in the creation of lending policy, a 
10-25070 equity position in soundly managed and regionally 
active financial institutions would be appropriate. At least 
60% of the principal should be invested in Government 
of Canada  bonds  and  short-term secure investments, such 
as treasury bills, however, to root the fund against the 
vagaries of equity investment. Finally, a 10-25% position 
in globally chosen blue chip common stocks could be 
taken to enable the fund to benefit from international 
market forces.  All  of the above investment decisions must 
be  weighed by the fund managers against the three primary 
objectives  of the  fund in terms of risk, liquidity and rate of 
return on investment. 
The dividend  philosophy may  be defined either in the legis- 
lative or policy  objectives or by the  fund managers in  the 
absence of direction from the beneficiaries. Options range 
from total diversion of all income (i.e., interest income, stock 
dividends and profits from real estate transactions) into  the 
general fund of a government to depress tax levels to various 
partial diversion  schemes,  which enable inflation proofing 
of principal and some level of per capita disbursements to 
beneficiaries. 
Caution  and public deliberation are recommended prior 
to choosing a dividend philosophy. A considerable range of 
opinion and experience  exists on  the efficacy of per capita 
disbursement programs. Albert Diamond, of the James Bay 
Cree,  says that his people avoided per capita payments as 
part of their land claim  settlement “because of the experience 
with monthly resource revenue cheques on the Alberta 
reserves”  (pers.  comm. 1988). The Cree  are  now  reconsidering 
a dividend program, however. Conversely, the record in 
Alaska with respect to the  annual disbursements from  the 
Permanent Fund is much more positive. The Institute of 
Social and Economic Research study (Knapp et al., 1984) 
noted that  the Alaska dividend program has had a positive 
overall  effect on the Alaskan economy. 
At the level of financial management, a policy of building 
up fund capital for the first years  is advised so that dividends, 
if implemented, will be of a significant size to be meaningful 
in the hands of recipients. Fund managers may want to 
consider a special disbursement program for  elders, who may 
not be around to participate in long-term benefits. Also, fol- 
lowing the Permanent Fund’s lead, dividends should not be 
greater than one-half of the fund’s annual income, so that 
income can be consistently applied to inflation proofing the 
principal and held in reserve for  other investment projects, 
such as equity positions in and  loans to sustainable regional 
small  businesses - including wildlife  harvesting and country 
food support programs. 
If a  corporate model is adopted  for  a  northern  natural 
resource trust  fund,  the beneficiaries will  have access to the 
traditional reporting mechanisms  specified  in the appropriate 
territorial legislation. Annual reports and accounting audits 
would enable beneficiaries to review the fund’s management 
with  objective data and to signal their pleasure (or displeasure) 
to management. Successive quarters (or years) of poor 
financial  performance would  provide  grounds  for 
management changes and a rethinking of investment phi- 
losophy. Low dividend cheques would also provide a signal 
to the beneficiaries that something was amiss. Those same 
processes would also provide grass-roots education and 
training for  the beneficiaries in the conduct of corporate 
affairs and, we hope, promote a better understanding of the 
business milieu. While the legal reporting and audit 
requirements of the corporate model trust  fund would supply 
the necessary objective data  for review purposes, the  fund 
administrators  should  also  prepare  and  disseminate 
pamphlets and videos to educate the public. The example 
of the APF is worthy of close study in this respect. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has reviewed the investment strategies of 
Alaskan Natives and the Alaska state government for the 
handling of windfall revenues  in the 1970s. It is concluded 
that business risk investment in a remote and isolated 
economy is inherently risky, and especially so when corporate 
directors have little experience in business management and 
a conflicting mandate from their shareholders. Conversely, 
portfolio management is seen to offer a  far greater return 
on investment and, via  dividend distribution, to promote real 
job creation in the service and information sector  of  Alaska’s 
economy. By combining the  trust aspect of the APF with 
specified developmental objectives, a model developmental 
natural resource trust fund seems attractive in northern 
Canada. Such a  fund, if implemented with  resource  revenues 
flowing from the imminent Northern Accords and the 
Dene/Metis and Yukon land claims settlements, could 
provide the impetus for sustainable small business 
development, beneficiary education programs and bank 
and/or  trust company development in  the  North. 
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